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Abstract: We experimentally manipulate two aspects of the cognitive environment --
cognitive depletion and recent sugar intake -- and estimate their effects on individuals’ 
time preferences in a way that allows us to identify the structural parameters of a simple 
(α,β,δ) intertemporal utility function for each person.  We find that individuals exposed to 
a prior cognitive load, individuals who consumed a sugared drink and individuals who 
consumed a sugar-free drink all defer more income than a control group exposed to none 
of these conditions.  Structural estimates show that all three effects are driven entirely by 
increases in the intertemporal substitution elasticity parameter (α).  Together, our results 
suggest that at least for complex economic decisions like intertemporal financial choice, 
the ‘attention/focusing’ effect of both prior cognitively demanding activity and prior 
assignment of a primary reward can improve decision-making.   
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1 – Introduction 
Formal economic models rarely consider the effects of the cognitive environment 
when making predictions about human behavior, but people do all the time: it seems 
common sense not to ask friends, family or colleagues to perform important tasks when 
they're tired or hungry, and to avoid making important decisions ourselves under those 
conditions.  This intuition has been confirmed by a number of recent studies by 
psychologists, which show that temporary conditions such as prior performance of a 
cognitively demanding task or a low level of blood glucose can alter decisions, especially 
decisions involving the exercise of willpower.  While this result has been replicated for a 
number of tasks in a laboratory environment (see Gaillot and Baumeister 2007 for a 
recent review), an intriguing recent field example comes from Danziger, Levav and 
Avanaim-Pesso (2011).  Looking at more than 1100 decisions made by an Israeli parole 
board, they determined that parole was much more likely to be granted early in the day 
than later in the day (i.e., after having heard a number of cases), conditional on a number 
of important factors including crime, sentence and ethnicity. Since a judge’s reputation is  
harmed more by inappropriately granting than refusing parole, there is a sense in which 
fatigued judges ‘take the easy way out’ relative to rested judges.  A fascinating footnote 
to the story is that following the parole board's midmorning snack, there was a substantial 
spike in the percentage of prisoners who were granted parole.  
These findings seem intuitive when considering how to prepare for a difficult 
exam, a public performance or a situation requiring emotional restraint.  But the 
relevance of the cognitive environment for many important economic decisions remains 
unclear.  Factors that affect immediate actions like using racial stereotypes or inflicting 
pain on others may not affect economic decisions -such as how much financial risk to 
accept or how to allocate income over time- at all, or in the same way.  For this reason, 
this paper studies the effects of temporary manipulations in the cognitive environment on 
time preferences over income.  We ask whether performing a task that can be considered 
cognitively depleting affects subsequent intertemporal choices.  If so, is the effect 
consistent with our intuition that cognitive depletion should make choices (subjectively) 
“worse”?  Similarly, does administering a sugar supplement affect intertemporal choice?  
If so, does this effect work counter to that of cognitive depletion such that it could be 
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used as a remedy, helping people to better concentrate their energy on the task?  
Specifically, adapting the Convex Time Budget technique developed by Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012a) we allow participants in a laboratory experiment to make a series of 
choices about payments that they will receive sooner or later, facing positive interest 
rates.  At interest rates well above those available outside the lab, we measure subjects' 
propensities to get their money sooner rather than later, and study how this varies across 
treatments related to cognitive depletion and sugar consumption.  Because our procedure 
allows us to recover the structural parameters of a widely used intertemporal utility 
function, specifically the discount rate, present bias and intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, for each subject in our sample, it allows us to translate the abstract concept 
of willpower into quantitative statements that are relevant to decisions like mortgage 
refinancing, retirement planning, payday advances and human capital investments. 
We find that time preferences are sensitive to transient features of the cognitive 
environment, but we do not find that cognitive depletion makes subjects more impulsive. 
Instead, participants who have been exposed to a cognitively depleting task (the Stroop, 
1935, test in which better performance requires resisting the temptation of giving 
automatic answers) exhibit increased patience in the subsequent time preference 
elicitation.1  We also find that fasted participants given a sugared beverage prior to the 
time preference elicitation are more patient, but that a placebo beverage produces a 
similar, albeit less powerful, effect.  These effects are economically significant in 
magnitude, corresponding to large differences in demand for short-term loans. While our 
results apply to a sample pool with above-average cognitive skills relative to the 
population (undergraduate students at selective universities), all the above effects are 
absent in a subsample with very high measures of cognitive ability.2 
Insights into the possible causal mechanisms behind these effects come, in part, 
from our structural estimates of preference parameters.  Both our descriptive estimates of 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we use ‘patience’ as convenient shorthand for a tendency to delay the receipt of 
income, holding other conditions (prices, amount of delay), constant.  Since ‘patience’ is sometimes also 
used, more specifically, to refer to an absence of present bias in a structural model of choice, we will be 
explicit whenever we discuss present bias per se. 
2 We determine membership in this subsample using the French post-secondary school examination 
(Baccalauréat).  This is commonly thought of as a measure of cognitive ability or intelligence, but we make 
no assertion as to what exactly it measures: effort, attention, recall, reasoning, logic or some other 
characteristic. 
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price-sensitivity and our structural estimates indicate that the clear majority of the effect 
of all of our treatments (whether depletion, sugar drink or placebo drink) is not on the 
subjective discount rate or present bias parameters, but on the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.  Essentially, while subjects in all treatments choose the same level of early 
income when early income is cheap, treated subjects are much more likely to reduce their 
early payment when its relative price rises. This suggests a model in which at least for 
complex decisions like intertemporal financial choice, the ‘attention/focusing’ effect of 
prior cognitively demanding activity can outweigh the effects of depletion and spillover 
on the subsequent time preference elicitation task.  Our results also suggest that giving 
our subjects a prior primary reward (the drink) may help them to better concentrate on the 
conditions of the intertemporal choice, and cast some doubt on the role of blood glucose 
per se in mediating intertemporal economic choices.   
This finding has an interpretation consistent with the Chabris, Laibson and 
Schuldt's (2008) arbitrage critique of intertemporal choice experiments conducted using 
cash payments. When subjects are actively aware of their outside options, their choices 
should only reveal their available borrowing or saving rates.  Interventions that help make 
individuals more aware and active in their choices should push observed preferences 
towards linearity, such that when laboratory prices increase past a certain point, subjects 
should make big allocation changes from one corner solution to the other. 
Policymakers, especially those who deal with consumer finances and financial 
literacy, should be concerned if preferences are highly sensitive to small changes in the 
environment.  Recent papers from Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004), as well as Beshears et al. (2011, 2013), Carroll et al. (2009) and Choi, Laibson 
and Madrian (2009), establish serious pitfalls in financial literacy amongst typical 
American investors.  The proportion of stocks in a portfolio depends on the proportion of 
stocks offered amongst plan options, and even dramatically simplified mutual fund 
disclosures do not help people avoid sales loads.  They also demonstrate that forcing 
active rather than passive choice and manipulating the default option are effective tools 
for improving decision making.  Our results suggest that attention-focusing tasks and 
remedying energy deficits may help stimulate the same type of active choice, and that 
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these effects are important even for college-educated subjects (though not for the most 
cognitively able of that group).   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a review 
of the relevant literature in psychology and economics. Section 3 details the experimental 
design.  We present our data analysis in Section 4 while Section 5 discusses our results 
and concludes. 
2 – Related Literature      
Experiments on willpower are common in psychology.  The Stanford marshmallow 
experiment, conducted by Mischel, Ebbesen and Raskoff Zeiss (1972) is a well-known 
example.  They determined that older children were better able to resist the temptation to 
eat a marshmallow for fifteen minutes in order to double their reward, but that overall, 
only about a third of the 90 participants were able to do so.  A followup study by Shoda 
et al. (1990) demonstrated that the ability to delay gratification in the original 
experiments was correlated positively with SAT scores.3  Another by Casey et al. (2011) 
showed that there were detectable brain activity differences during willpower tasks 
exhibited between the adults who could and could not resist the marshmallow as children, 
40 years earlier.  In economics, Dohmen et al. (2010) found that individuals with higher 
cognitive ability are more patient over a yearlong horizon. Taken together, these studies 
suggest that a person's capacity to exert willpower appears to be a relatively permanent 
characteristic that varies substantially across individuals, and is correlated with cognitive 
ability.  
More recently, and more relevant to our study, psychologists have also documented 
links between the cognitive environment at the time a decision is made, specifically 
whether the individual concurrently or very recently engaged in a task that required 
cognitive exertion, and numerous behaviors that require self-control or patience.  The 
prior exertion of effort in these studies is a transient characteristic that can substantially 
alter behavior in a task with completely unrelated incentives.  Muraven and Baumeister 
(2000) have shown that exerting self-control consumes limited resources and, as a 
consequence, subsequent attempts to control the self are less likely to succeed.  DeWall et 
                                                 
3 Funder and Block (1989) establish a similar relationship with IQ, and Kirby, Winston and Santiesteban 
(2005) do so with college GPA. 
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al. (2007) found that participants in a lab study who were forced to restrain themselves 
from eating a donut for five minutes acted more aggressively in a subsequent task. 
DeWall et al. (2008) deplete participants by having them establish a habit and then break 
it; they find that these subjects are less likely to donate food or money in a hypothetical 
scenario than those who did not have to break the habit. Also, participants who were 
asked to pay close attention to a video are less likely to volunteer aid to victims of a 
recent tragedy than those who watched the video normally.  Mead et al. (2009) also find 
that cognitive depletion increases dishonesty for personal gain. Baumeister et al. (2006) 
suggest that the desires to act spitefully or dishonestly are natural traits that individuals 
have to exert willpower to control. Cognitive depletion would act as a mediator of the 
expression of these desires via the stock of available willpower.  
While economists have long argued that interpersonal differences in subjective 
discount rates and cognitive ability might account for a significant share of economic 
inequality, and that present bias could explain temporally inconsistent behavior, they 
have devoted little attention to the effects of the immediate cognitive environment on 
intertemporal choices.4  Bucciol, Houser and Piovesan (2011a) demonstrate that 
productivity of younger children in a simple craft task is negatively affected by prior 
exposure to consumption temptation while that of older children is not.  This could 
suggest a mediating role for cognitive ability in willpower interventions (see Bucciol, 
Houser and Piovesan 2011b, for a survey on willpower in adults and children).  Houser, 
Reiley and Urbancic (2008) have found that the amount of time individuals spend waiting 
in line at a grocery store is positively related to the probability that they add a tempting 
item to their overall purchase.  This finding is consistent with the idea that willpower can 
be depleted over time. Additionally, Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011) reveal a 
significant impact of depletion via the Stroop (1935) task on procrastination; but as in this 
work, they also find that depletion actually improves task performance in the longer run.5   
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2013) find that distracting participants during their work 
                                                 
4 See Ryder (1985) for an early theoretical treatment of the long-term effects of discount rate heterogeneity, 
and Anderson et al. (2011) for evidence on the long-term effects of heterogeneity in both discount rates and 
cognitive ability.  Laibson (1997) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) study the effects of present bias. 
5 There is theoretical work on this exact issue as well: Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman (2012) construct a 
model in which depletion helps explain time preference reversals and procrastination; exerting self-control 
depletes willpower in the short run but increases it in the long-run, like a muscle. 
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increases small-stakes risk aversion, while asking them to provide the reasoning for their 
decisions decreases small-stakes risk aversion.  
Finally, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) find that inducing mild positive affect using a 
video clip leads to more patient decisions involving income receipt over time.6  In 
addition to focusing on two aspects of the cognitive environment (depletion and sugar 
intake) that have recently attracted considerable attention among psychologists, a key 
difference between our study and Ifcher and Zarghamee's (2011) is our focus on precisely 
how our treatments affect time preference --do they act on the discount factor, the level of 
present bias, or on subjects’ sensitivity to intertemporal prices?—and on how all these 
effects are mediated by cognitive ability.  Distinguishing these effects sheds light on 
alternative mechanisms via which the cognitive environment affects intertemporal choice 
that cannot be inferred from an experimental design and estimation framework that 
interprets treatment effects as acting on subjects’ discount factor only. Our finding that 
the treatments act on the intertemporal substitution elasticity suggests that they induce 
more focus and attention on the choice task, leading lower-test-score subjects to 
substitute away from high-priced options in situations where they otherwise would not.    
Given the small amount of economic research on the effects of cognitive depletion 
on decisions, it is not surprising that essentially all the literature on physiological 
interventions that might remedy depletion (such as sugar consumption) has been done by 
psychologists and neuroscientists.7  Among these studies, Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) 
show that exerting self-control uses a large amount of blood glucose which is the primary 
energy source for the body's cells and that failures of self-control are more likely when 
blood glucose is low.  In addition, Gailliot et al. (2007) show that self-control may 
depend on glucose as a source of energy: consuming a drink containing sucrose (which is 
rapidly metabolized into glucose) eliminates the impairments of performance in a self-
control task due to participation in an initial act of self-control.  Mead et al. (2009) also 
                                                 
6 Neuroscience studies that look at the sensitivity of intertemporal choice to emotional primes have shown 
both higher activation of the posterior sector of the anterior cingulate cortex resulting from a fear prime and 
increases in farsightedness due to an inhibition spillover effect (Luo, Ainslie and Monterosso 2010). 
7 A loosely related branch of literature in labor economics studies of the effects of breakfast and nutrition 
programs in schools on educational outcomes.  Wesnes et al. (2003) finds that breakfast interventions do 
increase attention and memory.  Notably, a glucose drink alone increased the speed at which items could be 
retrieved from memory for 90 minutes following consumption. Dotter (2013) uses a natural experiment to 
show that universally-free breakfast programs have large positive effects on both math and reading scores. 
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find that the consumption of a sugared beverage helps mitigate the effects of depletion on 
self-control and willpower.  Gailliot et al. (2009) find that these drinks decrease the use 
of stereotypes and slurs.  These studies are built around the Energy Model of self-control; 
energy is a stock required to exert self-control that can be affected by cognitive exertion 
and glucose interventions.8 
There is, however, conflicting physiological evidence on the mechanism by which 
glucose may affect willpower.  In response to the works cited above, Molden et al. (2012) 
use precise measures of blood glucose levels to demonstrate that exerting willpower does 
not decrease this stock, and that neither levels nor changes in blood glucose bolster effort 
on a subsequent task.  They additionally show that simply rinsing one's mouth with a 
sugar beverage without swallowing (with no effect on blood glucose) bolsters self-
control.9  Neurological evidence indicates that the sensing of the carbohydrate in the 
mouth activates a part of the brain that is highly sensitive to incentives (Kringelbach 
2004; Chambers, Bridge and Jones 2009).  The presence of actual sugar as opposed to an 
artificial sweetener is critical in generating this response.  This pathway is referred to as 
the Motivational Model of self-control.  Importantly, our method of sugar delivery should 
reinforce self-control according to both the Motivational and the Energy models. 
Relative to the above literatures, this paper is the first to study the effects of two key 
aspects of the cognitive environment --cognitive depletion and sugar consumption-- on an 
economic choice that sits at the heart of many of the discipline's models:  the 
intertemporal allocation of monetary income. Further, we formalize the rather fluid 
concept of willpower by specifying an intertemporal utility function with three 
parameters, each of which corresponds to a conceptually distinct aspect of “impatience” 
or “impulsivity”, and empirically estimate treatment effects on all three parameters.  
Additionally and again uniquely, we study how a semi-permanent individual 
characteristic, cognitive ability, mediates the effects of temporary manipulations of the 
cognitive environment:  are smarter people's intertemporal allocation decisions less 
affected by being hungry or by engaging in a depleting activity?     
                                                 
8 The glucose level fluctuates with the cognitive processes relying on executive functions.  In particular, a 
low level of glucose correlates with a low performance in the difficult trials of the Stroop test, but not in the 
easy trials (see Benton, Owens and Parker 1994, and Gaillot et al. 2007). 
9 See also Sanders et al. (2012). 
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Aside from estimating the effects of cognitive and physiological interventions, this 
paper also contributes to the recent economic literature on the measurement of time 
preferences.  Our methodology, the Convex Time Budget (CTB henceforth), was 
developed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) in response to concerns that using 
information on risky choices to estimate the curvature of utility functions over certain 
outcomes could bias the measured intertemporal preferences.  We modify the CTB 
technique by calibrating our prices to detect more subtle differences in preferences. Our 
results showcase ‘realistic’ (relative to typical rates for payday loans) and precise 
discount rate estimates.  This paper replicates previous successful implementations of this 
technique.    
A final related literature, albeit very small, is an economic literature that designs 
experiments with the aim of estimating the parameters of a structural model of 
preferences as outcome variables.  Numerous well-known lab and field experiments use 
treatment variation to identify structural parameters (DellaVigna, List and Malmendier 
2012; Charness and Rabin 2002), but very few estimate structural parameters separately 
for treatment and control groups so as to test the difference. Callen et al. (2013) examine 
whether exposure to traumatic violence and the priming thereof combine to affect 
expressed risk preferences and Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor (2013) randomly allocate 
savings accounts to low-income households and estimate the effect of this intervention on 
time preferences months later.  Papers in this category, including ours, also speak to the 
broader literature on the (in)stability of preferences.. 
3 – The Experiment  
3.1 – Treatments 
Our experiment consists of three types of sessions: Baseline, Depletion and Drink.  
Within each session type, there are five distinct parts, the orders of which change across 
session type.  In a Drink session, the phases are: (1) consumption of drink and entry 
questions, (2) rest to allow any sucrose in the drink to be metabolized into blood glucose, 
(3) elicitation of time preferences, (4) depletion of self-control in the Stroop test, and (5) 
an exit survey that includes Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).  The 
structure of the Baseline sessions is similar to that of Drink sessions, except that no 
beverage is given.  In Depletion sessions, we invert the order between the Stroop test and 
9 
 
the elicitation of time preferences.  Finally, within the Drink sessions, we have two 
conditions corresponding to a drink containing sugar or a sugar-substitute.  These 
variations give us four treatments: Baseline, Depletion, Placebo and Sugar.  Table 1 lays 
out the progression of the experiment for each treatment. 
< Table 1 about here > 
The comparison between the Depletion treatment and the Baseline allows us to 
determine whether performing an initial task that requires impulse control affects the 
decision to defer income in the time preference task.  The comparison between the Sugar 
treatment and the Placebo treatment allows us to study whether the consumption of sugar 
affects time preferences.  Finally, if time preferences react to the consumption and 
metabolization of sucrose rather than the drink itself, we expect to observe no differences 
in choices when comparing the Placebo treatment and the Baseline.  We discuss each task 
and drink consumption in more detail below. 
3.2 – Time Preference Elicitation 
 To elicit time preferences, we implement the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method of 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, henceforth AS) instead of the more common approach of 
using multiple-price lists (Harrison, Lau and Williams 2002).10  Among other advantages, 
this approach measures both discount rates and the concavity of utility while the multiple 
price list method usually assumes linear utility.11  In addition, it may be a preferable 
approach for estimating individual-specific preference parameters because the convex 
choice set means that each choice an individual makes carries more information than if 
the choice were from a binary set.12 
In every choice, participants received a budget of 16 tokens to allocate between an 
early payment, ct, and a late payment, ct+k, with t the early payment date and k the delay 
                                                 
10 With multiple price lists, the participants have to choose several times between a smaller early payment 
and a larger later payment with a monotonically increasing interest rate. Individual time preferences are 
captured by the point where the individual switches from the early payment to the later payment. 
11 Andersen et al. (2008) augment a time multiple-price list with a risk multiple price list to avoid this 
assumption, but this fix relies heavily on the expected-utility assumption of continuity in probability for its 
validity.  Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) demonstrate, exactly in the context of intertemporal choice, the 
failure of this assumption. 
12 Every choice from a convex set identifies the exact point at which the optimality condition of the 
decision problem holds. Choices from binary sets generate inequalities that bound parameter values. 
Repetition of the task produces overlapping intervals that shrink the bounds and asymptotically generate 
parameter estimates. With finite date, probabilistic choice approaches are necessary to identify parameters. 
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between the two dates.  Participants made 45 allocation decisions and one of these 
decisions was randomly selected at the end of the session for actual payment according to 
the allocation of tokens between the two dates.  The 45 budgets combine three early 
payment dates (t = 0, 5, 15 weeks), three delay lengths (k = 5, 10, 15 weeks) and various 
price ratios.  Thus, there were only seven paydays evenly spaced at five weeks intervals 
(0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 weeks).  For each (t,k) combination, participants had to make five 
decisions involving various interest rates.  We defined three rate progressions that were 
combined with the various early payment dates while the combination of budget 
progressions and delay lengths were kept constant.  The value of a token at the late date, 
at+k, was always equal to €1, while the value of the token at the early date, at, varied 
between a minimum of €0.67 and a maximum of €0.99.  Allocating all the tokens to the 
late payment date paid €16; allocating all the tokens to the early payment date paid a 
minimum of €10.72 and a maximum of €15.84.  The progressions were defined in order 
to offer implied annual interest rates, compounded quarterly, between 4% and 845%.  
Table A1 in the Appendix presents all the choice sets. 
The presentation of the 45 decisions was very similar to that in AS.  A choice screen 
had nine decision tabs that were displayed successively and corresponded to the nine (t,k) 
combinations.  The order between the nine tabs was randomly and independently 
determined for each participant to control for order effects. Each decision tab displayed 
five budget decisions presented in order of increasing gross interest rate.  To facilitate 
decision-making by a better visualization of delays, each decision tab displayed a 
dynamic calendar highlighting the current date, the early date and the late date in 
different colors.  It also displayed the values of a token at the early date and at the late 
date, together with the values in Euros of the earnings corresponding to the decisions.  A 
sample decision tab is reproduced in the Appendix. The boxes for entering the allocation 
decisions were initially blank. As soon as a value was entered either for the early date or 
the late date, the other box was filled automatically to ensure that the total budget was 16 
tokens and the corresponding payoffs in Euro at the two dates were also displayed.  
 This design allows us to estimate for each individual her discount rate, the curvature 
of her utility function (through the variations of k and of the gross interest rate), and her 
present bias and hyperbolic discounting (through the variation of t).  In addition, it allows 
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us to examine which, if any, of these dimensions is impacted by self-control depletion 
and sucrose consumption. 
3.3 – Cognitive Depletion 
We used a Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) to deplete self-control as shown by studies in 
social psychology (for a survey of the test, see MacLeod 1991).  In a typical Stroop test, 
individuals have to read the color of ink used to write words independently of the color 
names of words.  In some trials, there is congruence between the color of the word and 
the color of the ink (the word “yellow” is written in yellow) but in other trials there is no 
congruence (the word “yellow” is written in red and the correct answer is red).  The 
incongruent stimuli typically require more time and produce more mistakes than the 
congruent stimuli because the brain automatically decodes the semantic meaning of the 
word and needs to override its first reaction to identify the color of the ink.  Shortcutting 
the automatic process requires self-control. 
 In our experiment, the participants’ computer screen displayed a series of color 
words (black, blue, yellow, green and red) successively, and the participants were 
instructed to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, the ink color in which the 
word was written.  The list of possible colors was displayed at the bottom of the screen 
and the participants had to press the button corresponding to the color of the ink, whether 
or not that matched the color name of the word (see instructions in Appendix).  They had 
to complete congruent and incongruent Stroop trials in random order for 6 minutes.  On 
average they completed 126 trials (S.D. = 11.69).  As expected, the time spent on 
incongruent words was significantly higher than on the congruent words (two-tailed t-
test, p < 0.001). 
3.4 – Drink Consumption 
 Following Gaillot et al. (2007), participants in each Drink session were given 14 
ounces (40 centiliters) of a soft drink sweetened either with sugar or with a sugar 
substitute.  Both types of drinks had the same appearance.  The sugared drink contained 
158 kilocalories and the placebo drink contained 10.13  We used a double blind procedure 
                                                 
13 Specifically, the drinks were Fanta “Citron frappe” and Fanta Zero “Citron frappe”.  They were 
dispensed in glasses (not the original container) and appear identical (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).  
Neither contains caffeine, though both contain ascorbic acid (vitamin C). 
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to administer the drinks: neither the participants nor the experimenters were aware of the 
sugar content of the beverage. 
 After being invited to drink the beverage, participants could rest in silence and read 
magazines that we distributed during 10 minutes in order to allow the sucrose to be 
metabolized into glucose.  Three minutes before the end of this period, participants had to 
assess the beverage and to report their usual consumption of soft drinks.14  In the Baseline 
and the Depletion treatment, the same rest period of 10 minutes was implemented. 
3.5 - Procedures 
The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE-NG software.  It consisted of 
8 sessions conducted at the laboratory of the GATE (Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie 
Economique) institute in Lyon, France.  Undergraduate students from the local 
engineering and business schools were invited via the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). 
Between 17 and 20 participants took part in each session, for a total of 149 participants.  
Two sessions of the Baseline treatment were implemented with a total of 34 participants; 
two sessions of the Depletion treatment were implemented involving 40 participants; and 
four Drink sessions were implemented with 75 participants (37 in the sugar condition and 
38 in the placebo condition). 
The invitation message addressed to the participants of all treatments indicated that 
they may possibly have to drink a beverage containing sugar during the session and that 
individuals suffering or thinking that they may suffer from a pathology linked to blood 
glucose regulation (like diabetes) should abstain from participating.  After signing up, all 
the participants in all the treatments were instructed not to drink or eat at least three hours 
prior to the beginning of the session in order to stabilize blood glucose levels.  Upon 
arrival we recorded the time of their last intake.  Since chronobiology may influence 
                                                 
14 The questions were: 1) Please rate your enjoyment of the beverage you just consumed, between 1 and 10. 
2) How many calories do you think the beverage contained? 3) How often do you drink soft drinks (Coke, 
Pepsi, lemonade, ...): every day / every week / once or twice a month or less / less than twice a month?  
Although participants in the Placebo condition assessed the beverage less positively (mean = 4.55, S.D. = 
2.77) than those in the Sugar condition (mean = 5.57, S.D. = 2.58) (two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, p = 
0.097), they did not realize that they received a placebo. Indeed, they predicted the same number of calories 
contained in the beverage (mean = 124.16, S.D. = 86.26) than the participants placed in the Sugar condition 
(mean = 140.41, S.D. = 98.26) (p = 0.497). 
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economic decision-making (see Dickinson and McElroy, 2010), all the sessions were run 
at noon, when the level of blood glucose is low.15   
Upon arrival, the participants had to sign a consent form reminding them that they 
should not participate if they suffer from a disease related to failure of blood sugar 
regulation.  Then participants randomly drew a tag from a bag assigning them to a 
terminal. The instructions for each segment were distributed and read aloud by the 
experimenter after the completion of the prior segment (see Appendix).  
The elicitation of time preferences requires very strict procedural rules.  To 
participate in the experiment, the students were required to own a personal bank account 
and were informed by the invitation message that they would be paid by a wire transfer to 
their bank account; they were required to bring us a bank statement.16  During the 
session, instructions informed the participants that a show-up fee of €5 ($6.5) would be 
wired to their bank account in addition to their other payoffs at two different dates, 
regardless of their decisions: half of the show-up fee amount would be paid at the early 
date and the other half at the late date indicated by the decision randomly selected at the 
end of the session for payment.  The show-up fee had no differential influence on the 45 
allocation decisions. Participants were also informed that the dates mentioned on the 
decision screens were the dates at which the wire transfers would be ordered by the 
finance department.17  To maximize the confidence of the participants about the payment 
of their earnings, they received a document stating that the bank transfer would be 
ordered by the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS).18  In addition, the 
document mentioned the name, email address and phone number of the professor in 
                                                 
15 We did not measure individuals' baseline blood glucose level, which would have required taking blood 
samples. 
16 We cannot rule out that the information given in the message (payment wired to the bank account and 
possibility of having to drink a beverage) has led to a self-selection of participants.  However, the sessions 
were booked as quickly as usual.  In addition, we asked 44 students participating in another experiment 
with standard cash payment whether they owned a personal bank account; all of them answered positively.  
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the two criteria for participating were correlated.  Finally, the 
message did not mention that the payment could be made at two different dates, which could have 
generated some self-selection. 
17 The administration committed to respect exactly the dates of the transfers and sent us a feedback after 
each payment. We believe the transaction costs associated with this payment methodology are lower than 
the typical approach used in this type of experiment, which relies on personal checks or vouchers. 
18 In France, CNRS is a well-known science and technology public agency. It employs 25,000 people and it 
operates through 1,235 research institutes. Students are aware that the GATE institute is operated by both 
the CNRS and the University of Lyon. 
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charge of the experiment who could be contacted in case of any problem with the 
payment. 
 At the end of each session, participants received a feedback on the decision 
randomly selected for payment, indicating their payoffs and the dates of the two wire 
transfers for this decision.  Then, they had to complete an exit survey which included 
questions about their demographics and average mark on the final high school exam 
(Baccalauréat). Sessions lasted 60 minutes and participants averaged earnings of €20.43 
($26.62, with a standard deviation of €0.97 ($1.26), including the show up fee. 
4 – Results 
We present our results in four sections. The first section establishes a number of basic 
patterns in a pooled sample of all treatments, to provide context for the study of treatment 
effects.  The second and third sections are nonparametric and structural approaches to 
analyzing the treatment effects, respectively.  The final section presents some robustness 
checks.  Since one of our central questions is how subjects' responses to the cognitive 
environment are mediated by their cognitive ability, and since a large share of our 
subjects has very high cognitive skills relative to the French population, we present most 
of our experimental results separately according to our subjects’ reported achievement on 
the French Baccalauréat exam.19  To maximize statistical power, we simply divide our 
participants in half relative to the median score in our sample, which was 16.  
Importantly, because only 9% of French Baccalauréat recipients earned a score of 16 or 
higher (our participants are drawn from selective universities), we refer to our two groups 
as “high score” and “lower score” respectively.  Our high-scoring subjects clearly 
represent an elite level (about the top decile) of achievement among French high school 
graduates, while our lower-scoring group roughly represents the 50th through 90th 
percentiles.  Thus the results for our lower-scoring group are more representative of a 
typical high school graduate in France, and we focus much of our discussion on that 
group.20 
                                                 
19 The French Baccalauréat exam is taken at the end of high school (lycée).  In 2012, slightly over three 
quarters of French youth had passed the Baccalauréat. 
20 The results of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) performed at the end of the sessions are highly 
correlated with the Baccalauréat score, and we can replicate all our main results using this measure of 
cognitive ability as well.  However since subjects’ CRT results could be affected by our treatments, we 
focus on the Baccalauréat-score based results. 
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4.1 – Overall Features of Behavior 
We start by presenting two foundational results that verify aspects of our model and 
design, plus some simple descriptive statistics for the pooled sample across all treatments.  
The first result is that subjects’ aggregate demand curves in the experiment satisfy two 
general predictions of utility-maximizing intertemporal behavior.   
Result 1 – Consistent with predictions for agents who discount the future and have some 
preference curvature, mean demand for early income exceeds half the 16-token 
endowment at interest rates near zero, then declines monotonically with the price of early 
income.   This behavior characterizes both high- and lower-score participants. 
A simple but general model of choice between early and late tokens for any 
combination of early payment date (t) and delay (k) supposes that subjects solve:  
Max X,Y    U(X) + λU(Y),   subject to RX + Y ≤ M     (1) 
where X is experimental income received in the early period, Y is experimental income 
received in the later period, U′ > 0, U″ < 0,  R is the price of sooner income, and M is the 
endowment.  In (1), λ < 1 can depend on both t and k to incorporate both discounting and 
present bias, but is fixed within any (t,k) cell.  R, on the other hand, varies within a (t,k) 
cell as we experimentally manipulate the implied interest rate.  For this model of 
preferences, Figure 1 illustrates (a) that subjects should consume more than half their 
endowment in the early period (X > 8) when R = 1 because λ < 1, and that X should fall 
monotonically as R rises because income and substitution effects reinforce each other 
when the endowment is all in the later period, as is the case in our experiment.21    
< Figure 1 about here > 
Both these predictions are confirmed by the evidence in Figure 2, which plots the 
demand curves for the early payment (X), separately by score and pooled across all 
                                                 
21 Alert readers will note that equation (1) models demand for early versus late experimental payments in 
the same way economists typically model intertemporal consumption choices.  Of course, if subjects 
choose total consumption according to (1) but have access to perfect capital markets, their demand for 
experimental payments will consist of corner solutions (i.e. either X=0 or Y=0) that maximize the market 
value of experimental payments. Effectively, subjects would behave as if the U function had little or no 
curvature. We test this idea formally in Section 4.3 and argue that it may shed some light on the possible 
mechanisms behind our estimated treatment effects.      
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treatments.  With the exception of the shortest delay length and latest start date for both 
groups, the demand curves all start at above eight units of X at levels of R closest to one, 
then fall monotonically as R rises.22 The success of these basic predictions suggests that 
our participants’ choices are informative for the preferences we wish to study. 
< Figure 2 about here > 
Result 2 – There is evidence of small but significant present bias in our data, among both 
high- and lower-test score participants.  
Participants receive the first of their two payments either on the day of the 
experiment, 5 weeks after the experiment or 15 weeks after the experiment.  To test 
formally for present bias we regress early payments on dummy variables for t = 5 and t = 
15 as well as the price ratio while clustering standard errors at the individual level. 23  
Table 2 presents the results of these regressions.  If the date of first payment is immediate 
rather than 5 or 15 weeks in the future, lower-score subjects borrow significantly more of 
their endowment.  High-score subjects do the same for only the 15 week delay.   
< Table 2 about here > 
Finally, we note that there are only small and statistically insignificant differences 
between the early payment choices of high- and lower-Baccalauréat-score participants in 
our overall sample, which combines all treatments.  Specifically, lower-score participants 
select a slightly higher overall level of early payment, and display slightly more present 
bias, but neither gap is significant at conventional levels.24  As the next section shows, 
however, this aggregate result obscures sizeable differences in the effects of treatment on 
the behavior of high- versus lower-score participants.    
 
                                                 
22 Because we do not observe choices from a zero-interest budget and Figure 2 indicates substantial non-
linearity in the demand curves, we used our structural model to estimate choices at R = 1 to further test the 
prediction about income levels when R = 1. We found strong support, for all combinations of delay length 
and whether the early payment occurs immediately.  The minimum predicted zero-interest demand is €9.32 
(S.E. = 0.25).   
23 A regression approach is necessary because price ratios are not exactly balanced across the t dimension.  
24 Averaged across all choices, lower-score participants allocate about €0.70 more experimental income 
(S.E. = 0.54, clustered by individual) to the earlier payment date than high-score participants.  This 
difference is not significant.  We add interaction terms between the dummy variables for t = 5 and t = 15 
and high-score as well as a high-score level effect into the present bias regressions from Table 2.  The gap 
between early demand when t = 0 versus t = 5 is about €0.31 smaller for high-score participants, but this 
difference is not significant (S.E. = 0.38).  The signs and significances of the non-interacted dummies are 
unaffected. 
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4.2 – Simple Estimates of Treatment Effects 
Our first look at the effects of the various treatments is non-parametric.  Figure 3 
presents the mean demand for early payments across the Baseline, Depletion, Placebo 
and Sugar treatments by Baccalauréat score.  Since these comparisons are between 
individuals, the treatments are balanced with respect to prices, delays and start dates. 
< Figure 3 about here > 
Result 3 – For the lower test score sample, depletion, a sugared drink and a non-sugared 
drink all reduce the demand for early payment.  All of these treatment effects are absent 
among participants with very high test scores. 
The p-values in Figure 3 indicate that all three treatments reduce demand for early 
income amongst lower-score participants, with particularly strong sugar effects (p = 
0.003) and depletion effects (p = 0.046).  The placebo effect is significant (p = 0.093), but 
is almost half the magnitude of the sugar effect; the difference between the two effects is 
significant (p = 0.056), indicating that the sugar treatment had effects on choice above 
and beyond that of the placebo.25  On the other hand, only the sugar treatment affects the 
demand for early income significantly (and positively) of the high-score subjects (p = 
0.082).  This effect is not significantly different from the placebo effect at conventional 
levels (p = 0.143) however.   
A final noteworthy finding in Figure 3 is that high- and lower-score subjects differ 
substantially in their Baseline choices. The difference of €3.07 between the groups’ early 
payment demand in the Baseline is significant (p = 0.011).  Recalling that there was no 
significant difference between high- and lower-score participants overall, this suggests 
that, in essence, our three interventions have the effect of narrowing the behavioral 
difference between high- and lower-score participants by reducing lower-scoring 
participants’ demand for early payments. The next result probes the sources of this 
difference-reducing effect further.     
Result 4 - The negative effect of all three treatments on lower-score participants’ demand 
for early payments is strongest in cases where the price of early income is high.   
                                                 
25 We use participants’ estimates of the calories their beverage contained in order to ascertain whether this 
difference is due to psychology or physiology.  Amongst lower-score subjects, there is no evidence that the 
magnitude of the Sugar-Placebo gap is affected by the beliefs about the drink or that beliefs themselves 
generate differences in demand. 
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Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix plot the demand curves for early payments for each 
(t,k) pair for lower-score and high-score participants, respectively.  The lower-score 
participants exhibit a similar level of demand across all treatments at low price levels.  As 
the price of early income rises, early payments decline more rapidly in the Depletion, 
Sugar, and Placebo treatments than in the Baseline.  The high-score participants show a 
similar level of demand to the low-score participants at low prices, but demand is highly 
price-sensitive in all four treatments.  In this sense, the treatments appear to make the 
low-score participants more price-sensitive, and thus more similar to the high-score 
participants' behavior. 
To determine the statistical significance of the above effects, we define three price 
levels based on the relative value of early tokens.  When early tokens are worth €0.90 or 
more we say the price is low, when they are worth between €0.80 and €0.90, we say the 
price is medium and when they are worth €0.80 or less, we say the price is high.26  Table 
3 presents OLS regressions of early payment demand on the treatment dummy variables 
split by price level.  At medium and high prices all three treatments have significant 
effects for the lower-score group and the magnitude of the sugar effect is larger at high as 
opposed to low prices.  The sugar effect is significantly greater than the placebo effect in 
the medium price condition (p = 0.003) and borderline significantly greater in the high 
price condition (p = 0.105). Column (3) suggests an elasticity-reducing effect of the 
Sugar treatment on the high-score subjects, but the effects are not statistically different 
from the Placebo effects in either medium or high price condition (p = 0.132 and p = 
0.218 respectively).   
< Table 3 about here > 
In sum, our nonparametric analysis shows that all three treatments (Depletion, 
Placebo and Sugar) reduce early demand among subjects with lower Baccalauréat test 
scores, who are more representative of the educated French population than our high-
score sample.  This apparent increase in ‘patience’ occurs only when the price of early 
                                                 
26 Note that this definition focuses on the most salient aspect of the price presented to the participants: the 
changing value of an early token within a particular choice screen (t,k combination).  Thus, the ranking is 
different than one based on annualized interest rate. 
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income is high, so the treatments effectively make low-score subjects more price-
sensitive and therefore their overall behavior more similar to our ‘elite’ sample.  
4.3 – Treatment Effects in a Structural Model of Time Preferences 
To measure whether the treatments affected different aspects of participants’ 
preferences,27 we now estimate a simple structural model of intertemporal preferences in 
which the treatments can affect each one of the fundamental utility parameters 
(specifically, their discount rate, present bias and intertemporal substitution parameters). 
One primary advantage of the CTB method is that it allows for the precise estimation of 
the parameters of structural models of intertemporal choice, even on the individual level.  
We will consider two types of structural treatment effects: aggregate and individual.  
Aggregate effects will compare one treatment-specific parameter estimate to another and 
individual effects will compare the set of individual-specific parameter estimates within 
one treatment to those from another.  The two approaches yield similar results.  As in 
section 4.2, splitting the sample by test score is essential for understanding the treatment 
effects. 
We first provide a characterization of an individual’s decision problem.  Consider 
individual i making decision j.  Continue to denote X as the number of tokens received at 
the earlier date and Y the number at the later date.  Individual i is assumed to have power 
income utility (with exponent α) that is additively separable across time periods in a β-δ 
form (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).  Choice j is characterized by the 
price of sooner income, R, a delay between the two payment dates, k, and an indicator for 
whether or not the sooner date is today, T (equal to 1 if t = 0, and 0 otherwise).  As in 
equation (1), M is the total number of tokens available.  We suppose that subjects 
optimize in the following way:28 
                                                 
27 For example, while reduced utility curvature (higher α) is associated with higher price-sensitivity, it 
should also increase the response to k (the gap between the payment dates).  In general, because the 
demand functions implied by most theoretically interesting demand functions are nonlinear, the predicted 
marginal effects of each parameter depend on the levels of all the others, making simple regression tests 
only roughly informative about the effects of treatments on preference parameters. 
28 Note that equation (1) implies that the set of available allocations is convex: that the tokens can be 
infinitely divided.  While we offer subjects 17 possible allocations along the budget frontier rather than an 
infinite number, we argue that this is a suitable approximation to convexity. Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger 
(2013) perform a similar exercise with 6 allocations and find no evidence of bias due to discretization. 
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(Xij, Yij) = argmax(X,Y)  Xα + βTj · δkj · Yα     subject to     Rj · X + Y ≤ M .            (2) 
To identify preferences, we follow the approach of AS by applying non-linear least 
squares (NLS) to the demand function for sooner tokens, derived directly from equation 
2.  This approach yields the structural regression equation  
Xij = [M · (βTj · δkj · Rj)(1/(α-1))] / [1 + Rj · (βTj · δkj · Rj)(1/(α-1))] + εij .   (3)  
To analyze and test treatment effects, we replace α with  
α1 + α2 · Di + α3 · Pi + α4 · Si        (4) 
where D, P and S are treatment indicator variables, and make similar substitutions for β 
and δ.  Instead of presenting results on δ itself, we use r = δ-365 – 1, the yearly discount 
rate equivalent, for ease of interpretation.  
Setting out the structural form in (2)-(4) allows us to be more precise about how our 
manipulations of the cognitive and physiological environments affect subjects’ 
intertemporal choices than the more generic notions of ‘impatience’ or ‘impulsivity’.  For 
example, if a treatment raises r, it should increase subjects’ demand for early rewards 
relative to late rewards regardless of the amount of delay between the two payment dates, 
and regardless of whether the early period corresponds to the date of the experiment or a 
future date.  If a treatment lowers β (the present bias parameter) below 1, it increases 
subjects’ attraction only to rewards that are received on the date of the experiment; high 
levels of present bias (low values of β) generate temporal inconsistencies in choices that 
may correspond to psychological notions of a failure of willpower.  Finally, if treatments 
increase α, they make subjects more responsive to the costs of early income, which under 
some conditions (i.e. access to capital markets) might also be interpreted as an 
‘improvement’ in the effectiveness of subjects’ decisions.  All three notions are conflated 
in the more amorphous notion of willpower that is often used to interpret experimental 
results on the effects of cognitive depletion.   
We first estimated equation (3) without treatment effects, following our modification 
of the CTB technique introduced by AS in the calibration of prices. Our estimate of the 
aggregate yearly discount rate is 21.8% for lower-score types (S.E. = 5.9%) and 21.0% 
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for high-score types (S.E. = 4.1%).29  Our estimates of the β parameter are 0.976 (S.E. = 
0.008) for lower-score and 0.988 (S.E. = 0.007) for high-score, with both values 
significantly less than 1 (p = 0.005 and p = 0.086, respectively).  Thus, in contrast to AS 
who estimate β = 1.007 (S.E. = 0.006), we find evidence of present bias in the β-δ form.30  
Lastly, we estimate a lower degree of curvature: α = 0.922 (S.E. = 0.008) for lower-score 
and 0.942 (S.E. = 0.005) for high-score individuals as opposed to 0.897 (S.E. = 0.009) in 
AS.   
Result 5: The treatment effects on the structural parameters are concentrated on α, the 
utility function curvature parameter.  The magnitudes are economically significant at 
interest rates that correspond to predatory credit instruments. 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of treatment effects on the parameters of a common utility 
function, shared by all individuals in each estimation sample.  The treatment effects only 
show up as significant for utility curvature.  Both Drink treatments significantly decrease 
lower-score curvature, but the effect is significantly larger for the sugared drink (p = 
0.020).  While the high-score curvature increase is significant only for the Sugar 
treatment, this effect is not significantly different from the effect of the Placebo treatment 
(p = 0.167).  In contrast to the simple estimates of treatment effects, we do not see a 
significant effect of the Depletion treatment on the three utility parameters, taken 
individually, amongst the lower-score group.  However, depletion effects on both the 
present bias and the curvature parameters have p-values below 0.15 and the joint 
hypothesis that these effects are zero is rejected (p = 0.088).  The two Drink treatments 
have significant joint effects as well.  All three effects on parameters are jointly different 
from zero in the Placebo treatment (p = 0.021) and in the Sugar treatment (p = 0.001) in 
the lower-score sample.  The Sugar treatment also has a significant effect on all three 
parameters in the opposite direction in the high-score sample (p = 0.033).  
< Table 4 about here > 
                                                 
29 The corresponding specification from AS (Table 2, column (3)) estimates a rate of 37.7% with a standard 
error of 8.7%.  Because our maximum time horizon is slightly longer, we would expect a slightly lower 
estimate of the rate if individuals display some insensitivity to the exactness of dates far in the future.  
30 While this magnitude of present bias over pure allocations of money is not economically meaningful in 
our experiment, a 3% distortion of preferences could be very important for major financial decisions. 
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The fact that the treatment effects operate through utility curvature is consistent with 
Result 4: they make the lower-score individuals more price sensitive.  In the limiting case 
where the utility function has no curvature, optimal choices move from one corner to the 
other as prices change.  The less curvature the function has, the closer we are to this case, 
and the more responsive individuals will be. To illustrate this, consider subjects from our 
experiment making a decision about taking a 2-week payday loan against a €1000 
paycheck that comes with a 15% charge (APR = 390%). Roughly, the optimal loan for a 
lower-score, Baseline treatment individual is €310, which results in a €60 charge.  
Holding the discount and present-bias factors constant31 and switching to the Depletion 
curvature estimate reduces the loan to €220 (charge of €40), the Placebo curvature 
estimate to €140 (charge of €20) and the Sugar curvature estimate to €60 (charge of €10).   
Turning now to our method that allows each subject to have his/her own set of utility 
parameters, (α,β and δ), we make a couple of adaptations that are dictated by the 
estimation results.  First, we drop 21 individuals who lack enough choice variation for the 
successful estimation of the parameters. Second, because using the NLS technique with 
only 45 observations per subject delivers some extreme outlying estimates, we trim the 
sample at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of all three parameter estimates.  
This excludes 24 more subjects, leaving a sample of 104.  Of the 45 excluded subjects, 28 
are from the lower-score sample and 17 are from the high-score sample. 
Table 5 reports estimates of treatment effects on the individual-specific parameters 
using quantile regressions at the median value of the estimate distribution. Specifically, 
for each of the three parameters, we estimated a median regression on 104 observations 
in which the participant's parameter estimate was the dependent variable and the three 
treatment indicators were the only regressors.  Standard errors for these estimates are 
obtained via bootstrap with 1000 replications.  The estimated individual effects are 
largely consistent with the aggregate effects.  Both drinks significantly decrease curvature 
in the lower-score sample.  The depletion effect on curvature in the lower-score sample is 
now marginally significant; whereas it was marginally insignificant in the aggregate test.  
                                                 
31 We do this to recognize that the effects we find on r and β are not estimated precisely.  If we do take 
these effects into account however, the gap between Baseline and the other treatments is larger.  While the 
optimal loan remains at €310 in Baseline, it is €160 in Depletion, €90 in Placebo and €30 in Sugar. 
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The Depletion and Sugar treatments appear to have minor present-bias inducing effects 
for the high-score group. 
< Table 5 about here > 
All three treatments increase the amount of deferred income for the lower-score 
individuals by reducing utility curvature such that budgets featuring above-market 
interest rates generate large differences in allocations versus the Baseline. There exists 
some evidence that the Sugar treatment had stronger effects than the Placebo treatment.     
4.4 – Robustness 
If time preferences are indeed dependent to a degree on physiological conditions, 
it would be encouraging if our treatment effects were moderated by the condition in 
which individual subjects entered the lab. While subjects were asked not to eat or drink 
for at least three hours prior to the experiment, our survey indicated that there was 
substantial variation in the degree of adherence to this request.  Two subjects reported 
having eaten within the last hour, and roughly half the sample reported having eaten 
between three and four hours before the session.  We expect that subjects who have not 
eaten within the past four hours should be more susceptible to the interventions than 
those who have.  Table 6 presents treatment effect regressions on demand for early 
payment with interactions between the Depletion, Placebo and Sugar variables with the 
number of hours since last meal.   
Consistent with our baseline results, we find no significant treatment effects on 
the high-scoring subjects; this group’s decisions are also unaffected by the amount of 
elapsed time since their last meal.  Lower-scoring subjects, on the other hand, become 
less patient as the time since their last meal increases; this behavior evokes Danziger et 
al.’s (2011) parole board members.  Also, as predicted, low-scoring subjects’ sensitivity 
to all three of our interventions increases with elapsed time since their last meal.32  While 
this may not be surprising for the drink treatments, it is perhaps noteworthy that 
“depleting” our subjects via the Stroop test also has a larger patience-enhancing effect on 
hungry than on recently-nourished subjects.  This finding seems to reinforce our 
                                                 
32 Note that the uninteracted treatment effects no longer enter as significant because they are estimates 
specific to the intercept where the time since last meal is zero. 
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suggestion that engaging in a novel but cognitively demanding task can actually (at least 
temporarily) improve a vulnerable subject’s ability to focus on economic decisions.    
<Table 6 about here > 
To rule out mood or affect as potential drivers of our sugar or placebo effects, we use 
the elicited mood and beverage enjoyment data from the post-drink surveys (Drink 
treatments) and entry surveys (Baseline treatment). 33  First and foremost, mood is not 
predictive of demand in our experiment.  Second, we use a specification identical to our 
hours-since-last-meal analysis, but replace that variable with the self-reported mood 
variable, and exclude individuals from the Depletion treatment (since their mood 
elicitation took place prior to the Stroop task).  Results are in Appendix Tables A2 and 
A3.  We again find no substantive evidence that mood is related to demand for lower-
score participants,34 and weak evidence that high-score participants in the placebo 
condition may demand smaller early payments as their mood improves.35  
To add credence to our use of the Baccalauréat exam score as a measure of cognitive 
ability, we present treatment effect estimates split by CRT performance instead of by 
Baccalauréat score.36  As noted, these estimates should be interpreted with caution since 
the treatments may have affected the subjects’ CRT performance, just as they affected the 
subjects’ performance in the time-preference task.  That said, consistent with our results 
using the Baccalauréat, we find significant effects of the treatments on time preferences 
only for those who failed to answer a single CRT question correctly (slightly more than 
70% of these individuals are in the lower-score group).  Results are presented in Table 8. 
< Table 7 about here > 
Finally, we note that while our structural demand equation (3) is for a continuous 
measure of early income, our experimental subjects could choose only integer numbers of 
tokens; relatedly, optimal choices in (3) approach corner solutions as the degree of 
                                                 
33 Both mood and beverage enjoyment are elicited as numbers from 1 (negative) to 10 (positive). 
34 The same is true of elicited beverage enjoyment. 
35 Attempts to replicate the Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) result by using our treatment variables as 
instruments for mood fail due to a lack of relevance: our treatments do not appear to affect mood. 
36 As mentioned earlier, CRT and Baccalauréat performance are positively and significantly correlated. 
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preference curvature approaches zero (α approaches one).37  To check whether this 
affects our estimates, we estimated specifications with three options: 1) sooner corner, 2) 
interior and 3) later corner using a multinomial logit specification.  Results are found in 
Appendix Table A4.  Reassuringly, in the lower-score sample, the probability of 
choosing the sooner corner is significantly lower in the Depletion and Sugar treatments 
and the probability of choosing the later corner is significantly greater in the Depletion, 
Sugar and Placebo treatments. 
 
5 – Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies the effects of experimental manipulations of prior cognitive 
demands and sugar consumption on time preferences. A key innovation of our approach 
is that an explicit model of intertemporal choice allows us to distinguish three 
conceptually distinct aspects of ‘patience’ (the tendency to defer income) that might be 
affected by the cognitive and physiological environment: discount rates, present bias, and 
price sensitivity. We find that intertemporal choices are sensitive to transient features of 
the environment, but whether and how depends critically on cognitive ability.  Indeed, 
exposure to the Stroop task prior to the elicitation of time preferences increases mean 
patience by making lower-test-score participants more responsive to high prices for early 
income.  While this may be surprising at first pass, there are some reasonable 
explanations. We first note that our time preference elicitation task differs substantially 
from the types of impulse-control tasks typically studied in psychology lab experiments, 
and from our motivating example of the Israeli parole board.  The judges make a series of 
choices between two options all day long, whereas our subjects face a totally unrelated 
task that necessitates impulse control prior to the time preference elicitation.  It seems 
like the Stroop task primed the subjects to resist impulsive inclinations on the subsequent 
task.  Thus, our ‘depletion’ results suggest that priming consumers to exercise willpower 
and pay close attention may generate more effective intertemporal choices. This result is 
echoed in Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011), who showed that cognitive depletion 
                                                 
37 In fact, around 75% of choices in our experiment are at corners, reflecting the relatively low degree of 
estimated preference curvature among our subjects, especially at high cognitive ability levels and in the 
presence of interventions that reduce curvature. 
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improves long-run task completion rates.  It is also consistent with Tuk, Trampe and 
Warlop’s (2011) finding that increased urination urgency associated with a full bladder 
improves subjects’ ability to resist more immediate temptations in monetary decision 
making.      
 Turning to our drink treatments, drinking either the placebo beverage or the sugared 
beverage ten minutes prior to the time task also increases patience, and does so by raising 
lower-test-score subjects’ sensitivity to high prices.  The magnitude of the sugar effect is 
significantly greater than the magnitude of the placebo effect.  The finding that the 
sugared beverage has a positive effect is consistent with both the Energy and 
Motivational models of self-control.  The finding that the placebo beverage does the same 
appears to be inconsistent with both.  One caveat to this is that the placebo did contain a 
very small amount of sugar.  While this amount is not enough to meaningfully affect 
blood glucose levels, its presence could have activated the area of the brain that is highly 
sensitive to rewards and incentives, consistent with Molden et al.'s (2012) and Sanders et 
al.'s (2012) evidence that rinsing one's mouth with a sugared beverage has similar effects 
to consuming it.   
Another potential explanation of our estimated `drink' effects is a substitution 
between primary and secondary rewards. Indeed, the drink --whether sugared or not-- 
could be perceived as a reward, since participants were required not to eat or drink for 
three hours prior to the experiment.38  Consistent with the notion of a common neural 
value of rewards (see Dreher 2009), receiving a drink as a reward may reduce 
participants' desire for an immediate secondary reward (i.e. money on the day of the 
experiment). One difficulty with this hypothesis, however, is that the drinks should act 
primarily on subjects’ present bias, not on their price-sensitivity as we observe. 
Alternatively, the drinks could satisfy a different biological need than the need for energy 
(i.e. quenching thirst).  Relieving subjects’ thirst may improve their ability to concentrate 
on the time choice task compared with the Baseline treatment. Unlike the primary reward 
                                                 
38 Our reading of the existing experiments on sucrose drinks' effects on willpower suggests that, in contrast 
to us, many of the experiments did not ask subjects to refrain from food or drink during a period before the 
experiment (for example, studies 7-9 in Gailliot et al. (2007) do not mention that subjects were asked to 
abstain before the experiment).  This could explain the substantial placebo effects we observe.  This does 
not apply to Sanders et al.  (2012). 
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hypothesis, this mechanism seems more consistent with the fact that the treatments 
operate via price-sensitivity rather than present bias or discount rates.   
Finally, as already noted, a more ‘economic’ mechanism that could explain our 
results relates to a recent critique of time-preference elicitation experiments (Chabris, 
Laibson and Schuldt 2008), namely that the choices of well-informed, alert agents with 
access to capital markets in those experiments should be more informative about their 
capital market options than their preference parameters. Specifically, in our convex 
environment such subjects should pick corner solutions that depend on whether the gross 
interest rate on a particular choice is above or below their outside rate option.  While our 
Drink and Depletion treatments cannot, of course, affect our participants’ capital market 
options, it is possible that they affected the extent to which participants had the mental 
energy or focus to incorporate those options into their decisions.  Such increased 
sensitivity to outside rates would make our estimated indifference curves less convex 
(linear in the extreme), and thus be reflected in our estimates of α.39  
    The primary lesson of our study is that transient cognitive factors we rarely 
consider in economics can substantially alter economic decision making.  The 
magnitudes of our effects are considerable: According to our estimates, lower-score 
subjects in our Baseline treatment would demand an advance of  €310 when offered a 2-
week payday loan that comes with a 15% charge (APR = 390%), for a total loan charge 
of €60.  If our experimental manipulations affect preference curvature as estimated in 
Section 4.3, our Depletion treatment reduces the desired loan to €220 (charge of €40).  
The Placebo treatment further reduces loan demand to €140 (charge of €20) and the 
Sugar treatment to €60 (charge of €10).   
Payday loans such as the above are considered by many to be ‘predatory’ in that their 
short-term nature takes advantage of scope insensitivity in interest rates to charge 
astronomical rates. In these situations, our finding that all of the treatment effects operate 
through the curvature of the within-period utility function (which is also the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and the main determinant of the price-elasticity) indicates that 
unless consumers are highly attuned to their task at hand, they may ignore substantial 
                                                 
39 Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor (2013) use a similar elicitation to ours to study the effects of randomly 
providing individuals with a savings account on time preferences.  Echoing our results, their treatment 
effects are concentrated on utility curvature, suggesting increased sensitivity of choices to market options. 
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price differences across assets or credit payments.  This emphasizes the need to both help 
consumers make active and aware choices whenever possible and be vigilant in 
preventing firms from purposefully taking advantage of compromising cognitive 
environments.40  For those concerned about the external validity of our experimental 
measures, we point to existing literature that demonstrates a strong relationship between 
experimentally elicited impatience and wealth and health investment (Hastings and 
Mitchell, 2011), present-bias and credit card debt (Meier and Sprenger, 2010) and time 
discounting and credit scores (Meier and Sprenger, 2012).     
  Finally, we note that while the above effects are largely absent among subjects with 
very high cognitive abilities (corresponding to the top decile of French high school 
graduates), our main results pertain to a subject pool whose cognitive ability is still well 
above the national mean (representing about the 50th-90th percentiles of high school 
graduates). This suggests that sensitivity of economic choices to transitory environmental 
features is likely widespread in most populations of interest.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Gneezy and Imas (2013) demonstrate in a laboratory setting both that emotionally compromised 
individuals make poor strategic decisions and that individuals will ex-ante choose to compromise their 
opponents' emotional environments to precipitate such poor decisions. 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
Treatment Task 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 
Baseline 
 
Entry survey 
 
 
Rest 
Time 
preference 
task 
 
 
Stroop task 
 
Exit survey 
 
Depletion 
 
Entry survey 
 
 
Rest 
 
Stroop task 
Time 
preference 
task 
 
 
Exit survey 
 
Placebo 
Sugar-free 
drink & entry 
survey 
 
 
Rest 
Time 
preference 
task 
 
 
Stroop task 
 
Exit survey 
 
Sugar 
Sugared drink 
& entry survey  
 
Rest 
Time 
preference 
task 
 
 
Stroop task 
 
Exit survey 
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Figure 1: Predicted Behavior 
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Figure 2: Raw Data Demand Functions for Early Payment 
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Table 2: Effect of Start Date, t, on Early Payment Demand, All Treatments 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant (t = 0, R = 1) 
 
 
8.256 
(0.437) 
8.679 
(0.608) 
7.840 
(0.627) 
1(t = 5 weeks) 
 
 
-0.521*** 
(0.192) 
-0.678** 
(0.264) 
-0.367 
(0.278) 
1(t = 15 weeks) 
 
 
-1.324*** 
(0.286) 
-1.308*** 
(0.409) 
-1.340*** 
(0.403) 
Normalized Price Ratio (R – 1) 
 
-21.365*** 
(1.197) 
-21.535*** 
(1.723) 
-21.197*** 
(1.675) 
    
Clusters 149 74 75 
Observations 6705 3330 3375 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.   
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p = 0.003 
p = 0.093 
p = 0.046 
p = 0.082 
p = 0.917 
p = 0.604 
 
Figure 3: Demand for Early Payment by Treatment and Test Score 
p-values are generated from regressions of the chosen early payment on treatment status with standard 
errors clustered at the individual level.  The regression is run separately for lower- and high-score subjects.  
Each individuals makes 45 decisions, leaving us with a sample size of 3330 (74 clusters) in the lower-score 
group and 3365 (75 clusters) in the high-score group.  An approach that collapses the data to individual-
level means yields similar results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p = 0.003 
p = 0.093 
p = 0.046 
p = 0.082 
p = 0.917 
p = 0.604 
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Table 3: Treatment Effects on Early Payment Demand by Price Level 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant (Low Price, Baseline) 
 
7.976 
(0.803) 
8.809 
(1.036) 
6.449 
(1.146) 
    
Low Price X Depletion 
 
-1.778 
(1.093) 
-2.585 
(1.590) 
-0.276 
(1.460) 
Low Price X Placebo 
 
-0.865 
(1.074) 
-0.944 
(1.316) 
-0.492 
(1.703) 
Low Price X Sugar 
 
-0.530 
(1.073) 
-2.569 
(1.567) 
1.444 
(1.433) 
    
Medium Price 
 
-4.423*** 
(0.534) 
-3.848*** 
(0.645) 
-5.477*** 
(0.876) 
Medium Price X Depletion 
 
-1.287 
(0.862) 
-2.559** 
(1.171) 
1.171 
(0.844) 
Medium Price X Placebo 
 
-1.416* 
(0.793) 
-2.578** 
(1.040) 
0.789 
(0.754) 
Medium Price X Sugar 
 
-1.194 
(0.803) 
-4.321*** 
(0.943) 
2.024*** 
(0.657) 
    
High Price 
 
-5.764*** 
(0.739) 
-5.550*** 
(0.831) 
-6.157*** 
(1.038) 
High Price X Depletion 
 
-0.806 
(0.738) 
-2.019** 
(1.010) 
1.264* 
(0.653) 
High Price X Placebo 
 
-1.393** 
(0.686) 
-2.271** 
(0.967) 
0.268 
(0.454) 
High Price X Sugar 
 
-1.208* 
(0.686) 
-3.020*** 
(0.883) 
0.995** 
(0.441) 
    
Clusters 149 74 75 
Observations 6705 3330 3375 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.   
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Table 4: Treatment Effects on Aggregate Utility Parameter Estimates 
 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score  High-Score  
 (1) (2) (3) 
α (Utility Curvature):     
Baseline Level 
 
0.904 
(0.015) 
0.860 
(0.027) 
0.961 
(0.007) 
Depletion Effect 
 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.058* 
(0.031) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
Placebo Effect 
 
0.042** 
(0.016) 
0.087*** 
(0.028) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
Sugar Effect 
 
0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.105*** 
(0.028) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
    
β (Present-Bias):    
Baseline Level 
 
0.979 
(0.016) 
0.949 
(0.026) 
1.002 
(0.013) 
Depletion Effect 
 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.045 
(0.027) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
Placebo Effect 
 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.031 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
Sugar Effect 
 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
    
r (Ann. Disc. Rate):    
Baseline Level 
 
0.268 
(0.106) 
0.357 
(0.225) 
0.210 
(0.068) 
Depletion Effect 
 
-0.140 
(0.124) 
-0.267 
(0.256) 
-0.057 
(0.097) 
Placebo Effect 
 
-0.046 
(0.121) 
-0.076 
(0.236) 
-0.076 
(0.114) 
Sugar Effect 
 
-0.016 
(0.122) 
-0.219 
(0.237) 
0.109 
(0.107) 
    
Clusters 149 74 75 
Observations 6705 3330 3375 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.   
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Table 5: Treatment Effects on Median Individual Utility Parameter Estimates 
 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score  High-Score  
 (1) (2) (3) 
α (Utility Curvature):     
Baseline Level 
 
0.958 
(0.009) 
0.940 
(0.011) 
0.974 
(0.008) 
Depletion Effect 
 
0.016 
(0.010) 
0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
Placebo Effect 
 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.019) 
Sugar Effect 
 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
 
β (Present-Bias): 
Baseline Level 
 
0.979 
(0.026) 
0.949 
(0.028) 
1.013 
(0.014) 
Depletion Effect 
 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
0.041 
(0.030) 
-0.035** 
(0.016) 
Placebo Effect 
 
0.013 
(0.026) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
Sugar Effect 
 
-0.001 
(0.029) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
-0.035* 
(0.019) 
 
r (Ann. Disc. Rate): 
Baseline Level 
 
0.323 
(0.104) 
0.490 
(0.250) 
0.323 
(0.073) 
Depletion Effect 
 
0.048 
(0.143) 
0.017 
(0.285) 
-0.081 
(0.140) 
Placebo Effect 
 
0.105 
(0.148) 
-0.040 
(0.272) 
-0.034 
(0.192) 
Sugar Effect 
 
-0.000 
(0.130) 
-0.311 
(0.273) 
0.109 
(0.149) 
    
Observations 104 46 58 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses.  Parameter estimate distributions trimmed at the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
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Table 6: Treatment Effects on Demand for Early Payment with Meal Time Controls 
 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant (Baseline, just ate) 2.838 
(1.248) 
 
2.360 
(1.287) 
3.735 
(1.509) 
Depletion Effect 
 
 
1.357 
(1.645) 
1.281 
(2.069) 
1.401 
(2.079) 
Placebo Effect 
 
 
0.080 
(1.524) 
1.419 
(1.630) 
-2.326 
(2.159) 
Sugar Effect 
 
 
2.591* 
(1.526) 
1.102 
(1.700) 
2.090 
(1.844) 
Time Since Last Meal  (hours) 
 
 
0.434** 
(0.218) 
0.730*** 
(0.155) 
-0.049 
(0.223) 
Time X Depletion 
 
 
-0.474* 
(0.261) 
-0.677*** 
(0.241) 
-0.217 
(0.301) 
Time X Placebo  
 
 
-0.183 
(0.246) 
-0.544** 
(0.214) 
0.421 
(0.289) 
Time X Sugar 
 
 
-0.608** 
(0.250) 
-0.773*** 
(0.232) 
-0.122 
(0.270) 
Clusters 149 74 75 
Observations 6705 3330 3375 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.   
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Table 7: Treatment Effects on Demand for Early Payment by CRT Score 
 
 Estimation Sample 
 CRT = 0 CRT = 1 CRT = 2  CRT = 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant 
(Baseline) 
 
6.916 
(0.997) 
5.061 
(0.965) 
3.039 
(1.165) 
4.654 
(2.410) 
Depletion Effect 
 
 
-3.580** 
(1.405) 
-1.457 
(1.635) 
0.796 
(1.345) 
1.296 
(3.015) 
Placebo Effect 
 
 
-2.468* 
(1.240) 
0.251 
(1.319) 
0.096 
(1.653) 
-0.726 
(2.559) 
Sugar Effect 
 
 
-2.409* 
(1.351) 
-0.217 
(1.260) 
1.143 
(1.728) 
-0.299 
(2.599) 
Clusters 42 40 40 27 
Observations 1890 1800 1800 1215 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: The 45 Choice Sets in the Time Preference Elicitation Task 
Choice 
number 
Early date 
t  
Delay 
length  k 
Early value of 
1 token at 
Price of an 
Early Euro 
Annual 
interest rate % 
Maximum 
early payoff 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
21 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
0.97 
0.95 
0.93 
0.91 
0.89 
0.97 
0.94 
0.91 
0.88 
0.85 
0.97 
0.93 
0.89 
0.85 
0.81 
0.98 
0.93 
0.88 
0.83 
0.78 
0.98 
0.92 
0.86 
0.8 
0.74 
0.98 
0.94 
0.9 
0.86 
0.82 
0.99 
0.91 
0.83 
0.75 
0.67 
0.99 
0.93 
0.87 
0.81 
0.75 
0.99 
0.92 
0.85 
0.78 
0.71 
1.03 
1.05 
1.08 
1.10 
1.12 
1.03 
1.06 
1.10 
1.14 
1.18 
1.03 
1.08 
1.12 
1.18 
1.23 
1.02 
1.08 
1.14 
1.20 
1.28 
1.02 
1.09 
1.16 
1.25 
1.35 
1.02 
1.06 
1.11 
1.16 
1.22 
1.01 
1.10 
1.20 
1.33 
1.49 
1.01 
1.08 
1.15 
1.23 
1.33 
1.01 
1.09 
1.18 
1.28 
1.41 
36 
65 
100 
141 
189 
17 
36 
59 
85 
116 
11 
28 
47 
70 
96 
11 
44 
85 
139 
208 
7 
32 
64 
103 
154 
23 
82 
164 
278 
432 
4 
37 
82 
144 
231 
11 
100 
246 
479 
845 
5 
51 
116 
208 
339 
15.52 
15.2 
14.88 
14.56 
14.24 
15.52 
15.04 
14.56 
14.08 
13.6 
15.52 
14.88 
14.24 
13.6 
12.96 
15.68 
14.88 
14.08 
13.28 
12.48 
15.68 
14.72 
13.76 
12.8 
11.84 
15.68 
15.04 
14.4 
13.76 
13.12 
15.84 
14.56 
13.28 
12 
10.72 
15.84 
14.88 
13.92 
12.96 
12 
15.84 
14.72 
13.6 
12.48 
11.36 
Note: The value of a token at the late date, at+k, was always equal to €1. The price of an early euro (in late 
euros) is equal to 1/at. The yearly interest rate assumes quarterly compounding. 
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Figure A1 – Glasses containing either the Placebo or the Sugared Beverage 
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081611.251.5k = 35, t = 0081611.251.5k = 70, t = 0081611.251.5k = 105, t = 0081611.251.5k = 35, t = 35081611.251.5k = 70, t = 35081611.251.5k = 105, t = 35081611.251.5k = 35, t = 105081611.251.5k = 70, t = 105081611.251.5k = 105, t = 105Early Payment (Euros)Price of an Early Euro (in Late Euros) Baseline Depletion Placebo Sugar  
Figure A2: Demand Functions by Treatment, Lower-Score Sample 
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081611.251.5k = 35, t = 0081611.251.5k = 70, t = 0081611.251.5k = 105, t = 0081611.251.5k = 35, t = 35081611.251.5k = 70, t = 35081611.251.5k = 105, t = 35081611.251.5k = 35, t = 105081611.251.5k = 70, t = 105081611.251.5k = 105, t = 105Early Payment (Euros)Price of an Early Euro (in Late Euros) Baseline Depletion Placebo Sugar  
Figure A3: Demand Functions by Treatment, High-Score Sample 
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Table A2: Treatment Effects on Demand for Early Payment with Mood Controls 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant (Baseline, neutral mood) 
 
 
5.168 
(2.506) 
7.898 
(3.551) 
2.638 
(2.112) 
Placebo Effect 
 
 
-1.144 
(0.834) 
-1.922 
(1.163) 
-0.412 
(0.998) 
Sugar Effect 
 
 
-0.878 
(0.847) 
-3.407*** 
(1.120) 
1.567* 
(0.900) 
Mood  (-5 to 5 scale) 
 
 
0.046 
(0.438) 
-0.260 
(0.598) 
0.160 
(0.424) 
Mood X Placebo  
 
 
-0.383 
(0.539) 
0.381 
(0.754) 
-1.008* 
(0.586) 
Mood X Sugar 
 
 
-0.141 
(0.527) 
0.648 
(0.679) 
-0.500 
(0.558) 
Clusters 109 55 54 
Observations 4905 2475 2430 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.  Mood is 
elicited on a 1-10 scale.  We renormalize to -5 to 5 such that treatment effect estimates refer to neutral 
mood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table A3: Treatment Effects on Demand for Early Payment with Drink Enjoyment 
Controls 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant (Baseline, neutral 
enjoyment) 
 
5.408 
(0.674) 
6.491 
(0.896) 
3.422 
(0.681) 
Placebo Effect 
 
 
-1.258 
(0.809) 
-1.852* 
(1.037) 
0.004 
(1.021) 
Sugar Effect 
 
 
-1.054 
(0.803) 
-3.344*** 
(1.107) 
1.385 
(0.862) 
Placebo X Enjoyment  
(-5 to 5 scale)  
 
-0.231 
(0.160) 
-0.162 
(0.172) 
-0.318 
(0.277) 
Sugar X Enjoyment  
(-5 to 5 scale)  
 
0.295* 
(0.172) 
0.072 
(0.191) 
0.373* 
(0.196) 
Clusters 109 55 54 
Observations 4905 2475 2430 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.  Enjoyment 
is elicited on a 1-10 scale.  We renormalize to -5 to 5 such that treatment effect estimates refer to neutral 
enjoyment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table A4: Treatment Effects on Probability of Corner Solution Choice 
Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Model 
 Estimation Sample 
 All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score 
Corner Choice: Sooner Later Sooner Later Sooner  Later 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 
(Baseline) 
 
0.242 
(0.046) 
0.472 
(0.060) 
0.287 
(0.066) 
0.344 
(0.072) 
0.161 
(0.038) 
0.706 
(0.069) 
Depletion Effect 
 
 
-0.063 
(0.057) 
0.149* 
(0.078) 
-0.142* 
(0.084) 
0.217** 
(0.108) 
0.049 
(0.058) 
-0.030 
(0.089) 
Placebo Effect 
 
 
-0.055 
(0.054) 
0.111 
(0.080) 
-0.077 
(0.075) 
0.179* 
(0.096) 
-0.009 
(0.059) 
-0.033 
(0.111) 
Sugar Effect 
 
-0.061 
(0.054) 
 
0.060 
(0.078) 
-0.156** 
(0.071) 
0.307*** 
(0.105) 
0.040 
(0.053) 
-0.217** 
(0.091) 
Clusters 149 74 75 
Observations 6705 3330 3375 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  45 observations (budgets) per cluster.  The 
multinomial logit specification estimates the effect of our treatments on the probability of choosing either 
the sooner or later corner solution, with respect to an interior choice (all pooled).  This table presents the 
marginal effects of changing the treatment indicators from 0 to 1, holding the other indicators constant at 0. 
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Instructions for the Drink session 
(These instructions have been translated from French to English) 
 
You are about to participate in an experimental session on decision-making.  
The session consists of several parts. You will receive the instructions for each part after 
the previous part has been completed. 
 
Part 1 
Your computer screen will display a number of questions. We thank you for answering 
these questions with care. 
Once all participants will have answered these questions, we will distribute glasses of a 
beverage that we will invite you to drink. Please do not drink the beverage before being 
expressly invited to do it. 
Next, you will have to answer a few questions. 
After you have answered these questions, you will have to wait for the next part. During 
this rest period, you are allowed to read books, newspapers or magazines. During this 
part and throughout the session, it is not allowed to talk to the other participants. 
 
Part 2 (distributed after completion of part 1) 
 
Your decisions 
In this part, you will be asked to make a series of choices between payments you can 
receive at different dates. On each of nine decision screens, you will decide how to divide 
your payment for the experiment between two dates:  an ‘early’ date and a ‘late’ date.     
Altogether, you will make a total of 45 choices on the nine decision screens.  These 
decision screens will be displayed in a random order. You will have the following options 
for payment dates: 
 
Decide between payment today and payment in 5 weeks 
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 15 weeks 
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment in 30 weeks  
Decide between payment today and payment in 10 weeks 
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 20 weeks  
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment in 20 weeks 
Decide between payment today and payment in 15 weeks 
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 10 weeks 
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment 25 weeks 
 
On each decision screen, we will provide you with the exact calendar dates of the above 
payments, so you know exactly which decision you are making.  Today’s date appears in 
green, the early payment date appears in blue and the late payment date appears in red. If 
the early date is today’s date, only two colors appear on your screen (green and red). 
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You will be given 16 tokens to divide in each choice, but the value of a token changes 
from choice to choice.  The real money payments associated with your token choices will 
be automatically calculated for you to see as you make your decisions.   
 
To make your decisions, you can enter a number for the early payment (or the late 
payment) and move the up and down arrows. The box corresponding to the late payment 
(or the early payment, respectively) will be automatically updated by a number indicating 
the difference between 16 and the tokens assigned to the other date of payment. You can 
indifferently start by entering a decision for the early date or for the late date. 
 
Once you have completed a set of five decisions, you must press the “Validate” button to 
move to the next decision screen. 
 
Below is an example of a decision screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your payment 
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of the 45 
decisions you made to be your earnings from participating in this experiment.   
 
In addition, you will receive a €5 participation payment that will be split up into two 
payments of €2.50: one to go along with your earnings at the early and late dates 
associated with the randomly selected decision. You will thus receive two payments 
regardless of your decisions. 
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You will not be paid in cash today. You will be paid by wired transfers on your bank 
account on which you gave us a bank statement. The two payments will be done by the 
CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research) at the exact dates corresponding to the 
randomly selected decision. 
 
For example, if the selected decision indicates that you have chosen x tokens today and y 
tokens in 10 weeks, the CNRS will wire the first payment on your account today and the 
second payment in 10 weeks from today. 
 
Remember that each decision could be the one that counts!  Treat each decision as if it 
could be the one that determines your payment.       
---- 
If you have any question on these instructions, please raise your hand and we will answer 
your questions in private.      
 
Part 3 (distributed after completion of part 2) 
 
In this part, you will be presented with a series of color words (black, blue, yellow, green, 
red). These words will appear in different colors, sometimes matching the word (e.g., the 
word blue, written in blue), and sometimes not matching the word (e.g., the word blue, 
written in red). 
Your job is to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, the color in which the word 
is written, whether or not that matches the word itself. Click the button that matches the 
color of the word. Try not to pay attention to the word, but just the color. 
This task will last for six minutes. 
 
 
Example: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, the correct answer is « green ». 
 
 
 
 
 
 
